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The Termination of Transfers
Provision of the 1976 Copyright
Act: Is it Time to Alienate
it or Amend it?
I. INTRODUCTION
Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress "[tlo promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'
The framers of the Constitution recognized that creativity and inventiveness
benefitted all of society and should therefore be encouraged.2 Therefore, by
granting "authors and inventors" a limited monopoly in their works, the Constitu-
tion encourages "authors and inventors" to continue in their creative endeavors by
receiving the fruit of their labors.' With the Statute of Anne4 of England in mind,
the first Congress drafted the first American Copyright Act in 1790', keeping with
the mandate to achieve a balance between stimulating authors' creativity and
promoting broad public availability of authors' creative works.' Throughout the
years since 1790, the Copyright Act has undergone major revisions as the
sophistication of society has increased, changing the needs for copyright
protection.7 The focus on protection of authors has remained constant.' The
termination of transfers provisions of both the Copyright Act of 1909 and 1976
have frequently been accused of being overly paternalistic towards authors and
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This grant of limited monopoly to authors and scientists
allows them to benefit from the fruit of their labors. See Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant
Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897,
898 (1987).
2. See Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of
Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179, 182 (1992).
3. See Lohmann, supra note 1, at 898.
4. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 anne, ch. 19 (Eng).
5. William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907,915 (1997).
6. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see also Lohmann, supra note 1, at
898.
7. The advent of the industrial revolution began in 1760 in England spreading throughout the
world. See WEBSTER'S ENCLYOPEDEIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 727
(1989).
8. See Patry, supra note 5, at 915-17.
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their ability to negotiate for themselves. This overprotective approach has created
a tension between authors and publishers that prevails today. Moreover, the arrival
of the motion picture industry has created specialists in negotiations and contract-
ing for both sides, changing the equation entirely. Authors are no longer at the
mercy of the mighty publisher. Instead, because the termination of transfers
provisions are modernly inalienable, the tables have turned so that an author
contributing a bare story line may hold hostage the entire studio that developed his
story line into a blockbuster movie once the termination of transfer occurs.
Therefore, the balance between authors and publishers has lost its calibration. This
article will trace the history of this tension through the Copyright Acts of 1909 and
1976 by examining the termination of transfers provisions of each Act. Finally,
this article will evaluate the available ways to circumvent the inalienability of the
termination of transfers to restore the balance between authors and publishers.
11. THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Purpose of the Act
The prior system of copyright, originating with the Statute of Anne, imple-
mented the two-term copyright structure, thereby returning copyright to the living
author or his executors, administrators, or assigns after the first term.' As the 1790
Copyright Act underwent revisions leading to the 1870 Act, the controversy
between publishers and authors became bitter as publishers' resentment grew
because the paternalistic nature of the scheme clearly favored authors.' In 1905,
Theodore Roosevelt initiated revisions to the existing 1870 Copyright Act because
of the "prevailing view.., that authors no longer needed to be 'treated as children'
and protected from their own incompetence by the renewal device."" After much
debate, the popular view in Congress favored replacing the two-term system with
a single term based on the life of the author. 2 Nonetheless, as a result of William
A. Jenner's 1907 publication The PublisherAgainst the People, Congress reversed
itself. 3 Instead, concerned with the imbalance of bargaining powers between the
individual author and the powerful publisher, 4 Congress renewed the two-term
9. See Malcolm L. Mimms Jr., Reversion and Derivative Works Under the CopyrightActs of 1909
and 1976, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 595, 597-98 (1980); see also Patry, supra note 5, at 914-16.
10. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 598-99.
11. See id. at 599.
12. See id. The Librarian of Congress conducted revision conferences in 1905 and 1906 during
which bills emerged restructuring the copyright system to one term consisting of life plus thirty years.
See id.
13. See id. at 599-600.
14. See Patry, supra note 5, at 918-19 (noting that Samuel Clemens himself testified that the only
reason he profited from the success of Innocents Abroad was because he had retained the renewal term
ights in the story).
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copyright under the 1909 Copyright Act to allow authors a second bite at the
negotiation apple when the value of the work is more accurately known. 5 Hence,
the renewal term was designed to rescue authors from their imprudent bargains.
16
B. Establishing Copyright under 1909 Act
There were two schemes of copyright protection existing under the 1909 Act:
federal copyright and common law copyright. 7 Common law copyright vested at
the time of creation as long as the work was not published or registered with the
Register of Copyrights." Under this scheme, the work received unlimited
protection so long as it remained unpublished.' 9
Federal copyright protection under the 1909 Copyright Act vested at the time
of publication of the work with proper notice.2" Notice required the use of either
the word "copyright", "copr." or "©", in addition to the year of publication and the
name of the owner of the copyright appearing on the title page .or the page
immediately following the title page of a literary work.2' Publication without notice
or with defective notice immediately "injected the work into the public domain."22
Although the Act did not define "publication," common law interpreted publication
as occurring "when by consent of the copyright owner, the original or tangible
copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given away, or otherwise made available
to the general public."23 In order to protect authors from the harshness of defective
notice, the courts could find that only a "limited publication" occurred if the
publication was "not in the public domain" or generally published.24
15. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 600-01; see also Saunders, supra note 2, at 185.
16. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 601; see also Saunders, supra note 2, at 185.
17. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, A PRELIMINARY VIEW OFTHE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976,3-4(1977).
18. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER E7 AL., CASEs AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03, at 39 (5TH
ed. 1998).
19. See id.
20. See id. § 3.01, at 197-98.
21. See id. at 198-99.
22. See id. at 199.
23. See Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (N.D. I11. 1975) (quoting
MELVILLEB. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 49 (1971) and holding that Plaintiff forfeited copyright protection
in his poem when he circulated copies of it without proper notice to the American Troops in World War
I) affd, 536 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976).
24. See White v. Kimmel, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952) (ruling that an author's desire to
reproduce, circulate and distribute over 100 copies of his novel did not constitute limited publication).
C. The Two-Term Structure and Renewal
Federal Copyright protection consists of two separate terms of twenty-eight
years commencing from the date of publication." During the year prior to
expiration of the first term, the author had to affirmatively renew his copyright in
order to obtain the second term of twenty-eight years.26 Failure to seek renewal
prior to the expiration of the first term resulted in the work falling irrevocably into
the public domain.27 The right to renew belonged exclusively to the author, if
living, or his widow, widower, children, and then his executor or next of kin in the
absence of a will returning the copyright to the original owner.2" This is known as
reversion. According to the congressional record from the hearings discussing
the 1909 Act, only five percent of the copyrighted works were ever renewed.30
Under the 1909 Act, all of the rights that attached to the copyright could be
assigned.3" These rights included the right of reproduction, distribution, perfor-
mance, display, and preparation of derivative works. These rights transferred on
assignment as a whole rather than individually.32 Section 28 of the Copyright Act
of 1909 provided that the author could assign his copyright by written instrument
either during the first term or, after renewal, the second term.33 Because the second
term did not accrue until after the first term was renewed during the twenty-seventh
year, it was an expectancy only until such time as it actually vested. 4 Because the
author may not own the renewal rights at the time of renewal they become due by
virtue of his death, and any purchaser who entered an agreement with the author
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1999), which provides in part:
Duration, renewal and extension. [ ] The copyright secured by this title shall endure for
twenty-eight years from the date of first publication .... : Provided .... the proprietor of such
copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for the
further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have
been made to the copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the
expiration of the original term of copyright: And provided further.... the author of such work,
if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or
if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author's executors, or in
the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the
copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when application for such
renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly registered therein
within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright ....
Id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1946) (repealed 1947).
29. See NIMMER, supra note 18, § 5.02 at 337 n.1.
30. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 599 n.43.
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1994).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373,375 (1960); see also Mimms,
supra note 9, at 612-13; see also Saunders, supra note 2, at 186.
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assigning the second term prior to the renewal assumed the risk that the renewal
expectancy might not come to fruition."
The statute left unresolved whether the second term could be assigned during
the first term.36 In Fisher Music Company v. M. Witmark & Sons,37 the Supreme
Court addressed that issue affirmatively holding that an author's contract assigning
the second term of copyright must be honored. In that case, the authors of the song
"When Irish Eyes Are Smiling" assigned both terms of their copyright rights in the
song by contract to Witmark.38 The contract provided for the assignment of all
rights and renewals in the song.39 In compliance with the contract, Witmark
applied for and registered the renewal copyright.4" Two weeks later, Graff, the
only surviving author, also renewed the copyright in his own name and thereafter
sold his renewal copyright to Fred Fisher Music Co., Inc. in spite of the prior
contract with Witmark.4 Without permission from Witmark, Fisher published and
sold copies of the song.42 Witmark filed suit for copyright infringement to enjoin
any further infringement.43 Eventually, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether a contract assigning the renewal term during the
first term was valid in light of the statutory construction and intent of Congress
behind section 23."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion for the Court, drew from the
language of the 1709 Statute of Anne that expressly included the author's assigns
as renewal beneficiaries.4" Tracing the issue throughout the revisions since then,
he noted that the 1790 statute expressly gave the right to renew to the author, his
"executors, administrators, or assigns", while the 1831 revision eliminated
"assigns."46 Justice Frankfurter considered the omission only minor in the context
of the overall purpose of the amendment-to further broaden the rights granted to
authors.47 In so holding, the purpose of the 1909 Act to protect authors and their
families would be fulfilled by allowing the author to assign the renewal term before
35. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 612-13.
36. See id. at 601-02.
37. 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
38. See id. at 645.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 646.
41. Seeid. at 646 n.2.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 645-47.
45. See id. at 650.
46. See id (emphasis added); see also Mimms, supra note 9, at 602.
47. See Fisher Music Co., 318 U.S. at 650-5 1.
it had been secured. 8 And so he ruled. An agreement to assign the renewal term
would be binding on the author provided he survived.49 But, the assignment of the
second term by agreement during the first term was an expectancy which only
vanished if the author did not survive." In that case, the renewal right then vested
in the statutory beneficiaries.
Once again this decision sparked the debate between authors and publishers. 2
If an author could assign both terms of copyright during the first term, what was
the purpose of the second term?53 Publishers would refuse to purchase copyright
if it did not include both terms, thus defeating the purpose of the two-term
structure. 4 To further complicate matters, the issue of copyright in derivative
works came into play.5
D. Derivative Works
A derivative work is a work substantially based on the initial or underlying
work made with 'the permission of the original author. 6 Of course, if the
underlying work is in the public domain, then no authorization is required. 7
Section 7 of the 1909 Copyright Act defines derivative works as follows:
Compilations or abridgements, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations,
translations, or other versions of works in the public domain or of copyrighted works
when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works, or
works republished with new matter, shall be regarded as new works subject to
copyright under the provisions of this title; but the publication of any such new
works shall not affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the
matter employed or any part thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to
such use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in such original
works.5"
Provided the derivative work meets the originality requirements for vesting
48. See id. at 656.
49. See id. at 657-58.
50. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 186; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1990).
51. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 186; see also Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362
U.S. 373, 375 (1960) (holding that when the author dies prior to renewal rights vesting, the statutory
successors obtain the renewal rights regardless of any prior assignment according to section 24).
52. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 185-86 (noting the vacillation of the Supreme Court in upholding
the paternalistic objectives of the two-term system).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 186.
55. See id. at 189.
56. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 603.
57. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 183.
58. Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 7 (1994)).
774
[Vol. 27: 769, 2000] Amending Copyright Termination of Transfers
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
copyright, separate copyright attaches to the new work." Hence, a movie based on
a novel, an arrangement of a song or a musical derived from a play all qualify as
derivative works entitled to independent copyright.' The new copyright attaches
only to the new material contained within the derivative work and does not serve
to revive any copyright in an underlying work that is already in the public domain. 6
"[A] derivative copyright protects only the new material contained in the derivative
work, not the matter derived from the underlying work." 62 Additionally,
publication of the derivative work does not publish the unpublished underlying
work.63
E. Effect of Reversion on Existing Derivative Works
The author/publisher debate shifted in determining the rights of the copyright
owner in the derivative work versus the rights of the copyright owner in the
underlying work.' The derivative works issue becomes complicated when the
copyright in the underlying work expires.65 If the derivative work was created
under the authorization of assignment of a work in its first term of copyright, the
assignment dissolves at the end of the first term and the author or statutory
beneficiary resumes ownership of copyright by operation of the renewal provision
of the 1909 Copyright Act. The new term is deemed a "new estate" allowing the
owner of the renewal term to exploit the work free from any licenses, assigns or
other agreements made during the initial term.'
The question becomes, then, what rights does the owner of the copyright in the
derivative work have to exploit his derivative work once the reversion in the
59. See id; see also Saunders, supra note 2, at 183.
60. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 603.
61. See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2nd Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951) (holding that derivative work copyright renewal extended only to the new
elements in that version); see also Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484,491 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977) (distinguishing Ricordi from Rohaueron basis that assignment agreement
of the renewal term in the former did not include the derivative material whereas in the latter the
assignment explicitly included the derivative work). This discussion also appears in Russell v. Price,
612 F.2d 1123, 1127 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980).
62. MELVILLE NIMMER, I NimMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.04, (1979) (citing Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d
1123, 1128 (1979)).63. See O'Neill v. General Film Co., 157 N.Y.S. 1028 (1916) (holding that scenes contained in the
unpublished play not included in the derivative motion picture were not published and therefore did not
destroy the common law copyright therein).
64. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 183-84.
65. See id. at 182-83.
66. See Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 492; see also Ricordi, 189 F.2d at 471; Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels,
Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960).
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underlying copyright occurs?67 The first line of cases to decide this issue held that
the derivative work owner lost the right to further exploitation.68 In Fitch v.
Schubert,69 the first such holding, Plaintiff obtained copyright in the underlying
work as a statutory beneficiary when his cousin Clyde Fitch died intestate passing
the remaining interest in the first term of copyright in his play, Barbara Frietchie,
the Frederick Girl, to Fitch's mother.7 ° Fitch's mother then bequeathed the
copyright interest to the Actor's Fund of America.7 In 1925, the Shuberts
contacted Actor's Fund of America and secured copyright license to produce a
musical version of the play.72 The first term expired in 1928, with next of kin
Clyde Fitch obtaining renewal for the second term. Fitch entered into an agreement
with the Shuberts granting them license on payment of royalties to continue
exploiting their derivative work.73 Despite this agreement, Fitch sued the Shuberts
enjoining any further exploitation of their derivative work, carrying out his threat
to bar use of the musical unless the Shuberts agreed to pay even more money.74
The Court denied the injunction based on the licensing agreements, reserving
judgment as to the term of license.75 Thus, the holding established that the
proprietor of a derivative work cannot further exploit that work without first
acquiring license from the statutory beneficiary to the renewal term of the
underlying work.76
The second major decision on this issue came by way of G. Ricordi & Co. v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc. 77 concerning the production of the famous opera Madame
Butterfly. In 1897, John Luther Long wrote the novel MADAME BUTERFLY and
secured copyright.78 Long assigned his copyright in the novel to David Belasco
who subsequently created the derivative play.79 In 1901, Long and Belasco
contracted with G. Ricordi to write the libretto for an operetta based on the play.80
Although Long renewed the copyright to the novel in 1925, Belasco failed to renew
copyright in the play.8' Consequently, the new material contained in the play fell
67. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 189-90.
68. See Lohmann, supra note 1, at 902.
69. 69 20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
70. See id. at 314.
71. See id.
72. See id. Although the exact chain of title for the transfer is not apparent in the Fitch opinion,
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977),
delineates the chain of title. See also Peter Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures,
Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REV. 715, 796 n.285 (1981) (noting that the
Killiam court must have consulted the actual Fitch files).
73. See Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. at 315.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 316.
76. See Lohmann, supra note 1, at 902.
77. 189 F.2d 469 (2d. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
78. See id. at 470.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 470-71.
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into the public domain.82 Paramount Pictures obtained the motion picture rights of
the renewal term in the novel in 1932.83 Ricordi sued Paramount Pictures under the
premise that he held the motion picture rights of his operetta." However, the court
held that Ricordi's copyright only protected the new material in the operetta, not
the common elements from the play or the novel, and therefore excluded motion
picture rights in the operetta.85 Consequently, Paramount Pictures could make a
movie based on the novel and the play without using the music from Ricordi's
operetta.86 Ricordi, on the other hand, could exploit the music and added material
in the operetta but could not make a movie based on the story embedded in the
lyrics of the music.87 This case came to stand for the proposition that a "derivative
work proprietor may not continue to exploit the underlying work originally granted
after the transfer of rights to use that underlying work was terminated."8
With these decisions, the court has continued to favor the author of the
underlying work over the purchaser of the assignment in keeping with the
constitutional framers' intent to afford authors the limited use of their works in
order to promote the scientific and useful arts.89 Professor Nimmer developed his
subordination theory based on this line of decisions, asserting that the derivative
work rights are secondary to the rights in the underlying material when a conflict
between the two interests arises.'
But, when the derivative work involved is a movie, where substantial financial
investment exists in the derivative work, has the balance between author and
"publisher" now reversed?91 In Rohauer v. Killiam,92 the second circuit shifted the
balance in recognizing the equities involved when a derivative work proprietor
makes a significant investment in his work.9 3 In Rohauer, British subject Edith
Hull authored the novel "The Sons of the Sheik."94 The novel received U.S.
copyright protection when the work was published in the United States in 1925."5
By contract signed in 1925, Hull assigned the motion picture rights to Joseph H.
82. See id. at 471.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 470.
85. Seeid. at471.
86. See id. at 472.
87. See id.; see also Lohmann, supra note 1, at 903 & n.60.
88. See Lohmann, supra note 1, at 903.
89. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 181.
90. See Lohmann, supra note 1, at 904; see also Saunders supra note 2, at 190-91.
91. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 181.
92. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977).
93. See Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1977).
94. See id. at 486.
95. See id.
Moskowitz in exchange for $21,000.96 In that agreement, Hull specifically agreed
"to renew or procure the renewal of the copyrights in the story prior to their
expiration and thereupon to assign to [Moskowitz] the motion picture rights for the
renewal term."97 In 1926, a successful silent film starring Rudolph Valentino was
produced and released in the United States.9" Moskowitz' assignees secured
copyright protection in the film on August 24, 1926, which was renewed in 1954
by the successors in interest and then transferred to Killiam Shows, Inc.9 9 Edith
Hull died in 1943 prior to the renewal year for the underlying novel. "0 Conse-
quently, her sole surviving child, Cecil Hull, renewed the copyright in 1952 and
assigned all of her rights to Rohauer in 1965 for the equivalent of $1250.10'
Television station WNET rebroadcast the movie Son of the Sheik on July 13, 1971
and Rohauer sued for copyright infringement." Rohauer argued that because the
reversion Cecil Hull inherited constituted a "new estate" in the underlying
copyright, free from all prior assigns and licenses, all rights in the derivative work
resulting from the previous assignment terminated on reversion."°3
Despite the prior ruling in the Fisher" case, the Rohauer court found the
opinion far less settled. 5 In fact, it noted that the current Register of Copyright,
Barbara A. Ringer, was rather tentative on the matter, and that other law review
articles were simply conclusory on the subject.0 6 In addition, other articles had
been written that were quite contrary to the "settled" view:
[t]he cases indicate that the proprietor of the copyright in an authorized new work
who no longer has authorization to use the underlying work may continue to use the
new work in substantially identical form but may not create a new version of the
new work which also constitutes a new version of the underlying work.'o7
For the first time, the court noted the evolving equities with the new medium
weighing the policy considerations:
the equities lie preponderantly in favor of the proprietor of the derivative copyright.
In contrast to the situation where an assignee or licensee has done nothing more than
print, publicize and distribute a copyrighted story or novel, a person who with the
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 486-87.
103. See id. at 492.
104. See FisherMusic Corp., Inc., v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); see also supra notes
39-53 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Fisher).
105. See id. at 492-93.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 493 (citing Professor Donald Engel in 12 BULLETIN OF THE COPYRIGHT SOcIETY 83,
119-20 & n.126 (1964)).
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consent of the author has created an opera or a motion picture film will often have
made contributions literary, musical and economic as great as or greater than the
original author. 0 8
Because of the difficulty in determining the identity of the statutory heirs when
initially contracting with the author of the work, once the significant investment is
made in the derivative work, the copyright holder of the derivative work has little
means of protection."° The court further noted the problem to be equally existing
as to licensees and assignees in the underlying work who have not created a
derivative work, but due to the lack of investment is less of a consideration. 0 "To
be sure, this problem exists in equal degree with respect to assignments or licenses
of underlying copyright, but in such cases there, is not the countervailing
consideration that large and independently copyrightable contributions will have
been made by the transferee.' Furthermore, the court distinguished Rohauer
from Fitch and Ricordi because only the Rohauer assignment agreement included
the renewal term and therefore the latter two had no expectancy beyond the first
time in utilizing the derivative work."2
Finally, drawing from the legislative history of the newly enacted 1976
Copyright Act derivative works exception to the termination of transfer
provisions,' " as well as the for above stated-reasons, the court ruled that no
infringement occurred. 14
The Rohauer decision instantly changed the manner of deal-making within the
108. id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 490-91; see also Mimms, supra note 9, at 611-12.
113. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A); see also Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 494 n. Il (citing S.
Rep. No. 94-473 at 111 (1975): "An important limitation on the rights of a copyright owner under a
terminated grant is specified in section 203(b)(1). This clause provides that, notwithstanding a
termination, a derivative work prepared earlier may 'continue to be utilized' under the conditions of the
terminated grant; the clause adds, however, that this privilege is not broad enough to permit the
preparation of other derivative works. In other words, a film made from a play could continue to be
licensed for performance after the motion picture contract had been terminated, but any remake rights
covered by the contract would be cut off."); see also Second Supplementary Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1975 Revision Bill, October-December
1975, ch. XI, p. 10: "Section 203 is a compromise that attempts to balance the interests of individual
authors and their transferees in a fairer way than the present renewal provision."
114. See Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493 (noting that the owner of a derivative copyright has no effective
means of protecting himself "against the eventuality of the author's death before the renewal period
since there is no way of telling who will be the surviving widow, children, or next of kin or the executor
until that date arrives").
motion picture industry."5 Assignment contracts were created and entered into
with the understanding that use of the derivative work would continue even after
expiration of the underlying copyright term." 6 However, these contracts later
became problematic as the court began to reverse itself."7
The Rohauer opinion was also the subject of much criticism for its strained
interpretation of the portion of 17 U.S.C. § 7 commonly known as the "force or
validity clause":'
[blut the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force or validity of
any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part thereof, or be
construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works, or to secure
or extend copyright in such original works." 9
Judge Friendly construed this portion solely to preclude any attempt to revive the
underlying copyright simply by making minor changes. 20 Defendants argued that
this "but" clause prevented only second-generation derivative works and not, as
Plaintiffs argued, the total proscription of the derivative work.' 2' The actual
difficulty in interpreting the "force or validity clause" found in section 7 of the
1909 Copyright Act, as to motion picture derivative works, is that this medium did
not exist at the time the 1909 Copyright Act was written. '22 Hence, Judge Friendly
attempted to ascertain the intent of the drafters on a matter that they never even
contemplated. 23
Friendly's decision was further criticized for distinguishing Rohauer from
Fitch and Ricordi on the grounds that only the Rohauer parties actually bargained
for the renewal term in the assignment agreement in their exchange. 24 Mimms
notes that Judge Friendly's distinction of the cases on this ground shows his
misconception of the nature of the assigned renewal interest. 2 ' Because the
renewal interest is a future interest, it does not vest until renewal.'26 As with any
future interest, the assignee takes only what the owner has to assign, that is, an
expectancy only:
[u]ntil [the renewal period] arrives, assignees of renewal rights take the risk that the
rights acquired may never vest in their assignors. A purchaser of such an interest
115. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 180-81 n.4 and accompanying text.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 202.
118. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 607.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 7, superceded by 17 U.S.C. § 100 (1976).
120. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 608.
121. See id.
122. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 201.
123. See id. (citing Rohauer v. Killian Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 486 (2nd Cir. 1997)).
124. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 610-11.
125. Seeid. at612.
126. See id.
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is deprived of nothing. Like all purchasers of contingent interests, he takes subject
to the possibility that the contingency may not occur.27
In signaling the first retreat from the Rohauer decision, the Ninth Circuit in
Russell v. Price2 ' applied Nimmer's subordination theory in holding that the
unlicensed rental of a derivative movie in the public domain based on the play
Pygmalion infringed on the play's still existing copyright.'29 George Bernard Shaw
copyrighted his play Pygmalion in 1913.'° After renewing the copyright in 1941,
the work remained protected through 1988.' In 1966, for reasons not stated in the
record, the copyright on the MGM film based on Pygmalion expired, thus placing
the work in the public domain. 3 2 The play's copyright proprietors licensed Janus
Films to exclusively distribute the film Pygmalion.133 Upon discovering that
Budget Films was leasing copies of the film, Janus filed suit against Budget for
copyright infringement. 4  In reliance on the Rohauer decision, Defendants
contended that anyone was free to distribute prints of the film because it was now
dedicated to the public.'35 The court, however, did not find the extenuating
circumstances, as were present in the Rohauer case where the derivative work
proprietor had made a substantial contribution to the underlying work, and thus
requiring the balancing of the equities. '36 Here, Budget sought to take advantage
of a work in the public domain to which it' had contributed nothing.'37 That being
the case, the court refused to extend the Rohauer decision beyond its facts to allow
a noncontributing exploiter of a derivative work to continue that exploitation when
a valid copyright remained in the underlying work.'38 Once the derivative copyright
expired, there was no longer a conflict between the underlying work and the
127. Id. at 612-13 (citing Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 378 (1960)
(emphasis added)).
128. 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979).
129. See id. at 1128.
130. See id. at 1124.
131. See id. The copyright would have expired during the freeze period, therefore it was extended
by 19 years pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 304(b). See id.
132. See id. at 1124-25.
133. Seeid. at 1125.
134. See id. Initially Janus brought suit in California state court under the theory of unfair
competition. See id. However, after two and one half years of litigation, the court dismissed the action
for lack ofjurisdiction and held that the true nature of the lawsuit was copyright infringement. Seeid.
Janus, acting under power of attorney from the English copyright proprietors, then filed the instant
action. See id.
135. See id. at 1126.
136. See id. at 1127.
137. See id. at 1127-28.
138. See id. at 1128.
derivative work.'39 Consequently, the court reaffirmed the prior doctrine "that a
derivative copyright protects only the new material contained in the derivative
work, not the matter derived from the underlying work."'"
With the Ninth Circuit seemingly in conflict with the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stewart v. Abend141 to resolve the issue.
142
Cornell Woolrich wrote a short story first published in Dime Detective Magazine
in February 1942, entitled "It Had to be Murder.' ' 43 In 1945, Woolrich assigned
the motion picture rights to the story to B.G. De Sylva Productions agreeing also
to assign the renewal term.' 44 Later, in 1953 De Sylva's successors in interest sold
the motion picture rights to "It Had to be Murder" to Alfred Hitchcock and Jimmy
Stewart for $10,000 and Paramount Pictures produced and distributed the resultant
film "Rear Window."'' 45 When Woolrich died in 1968, prior to the renewal year
leaving no heirs, his executor Chase Manhattan Bank renewed the rights to "It Had
to be Murder" and sold them to Abend. 46 ABC televised "Rear Window" in 1971
and Abend sued Hitchcock, Stewart and MCA for infringement.' 47 This lawsuit
settled for $25,000. 1'  However, three years later the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Rohauer holding that the derivative works
proprietor had an independent right to exploit the derivative work even though the
initial grant had terminated. 4 9 Several years later in reliance on that opinion,
Petitioners re-released "Rear Window" in several media forms. ' Once again,
Abend sued claiming that this re-release combined with Petitioner's plans to make
139. See id. (noting that the main difference between Russell and Rohauer was the nonexistence of
conflicting copyright interests). The Rohauer court applied the "new estate" theory to derivative works
as Nimmer succinctly stated,
[o]nce a derivative work is created pursuant to a valid license to use the underlying material,
a new property right springs into existence with respect to the entire derivative work, so that
even if the license is thereafter terminated the proprietor of the derivative work may
nevertheless continue to use the material from the underlying work as contained in the
derivative work.
MELVILLE NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 3.07(A), 3.23 (1979); see also Russell, 612 F.2d at
1128 n.13.
140. See id. at 1128 (citing MELVILLE NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.04 (1979)).
141. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
142. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 180.
143. See id. at 196.
144. See id. at 212. Woolrich assigned a group of stories which included "It Had to be Murder" to
De Sylva for $9250. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 196-97. The purchase price was $650 plus 10% of all proceeds from use of the story.
See id. at 197.
147. See id. at 197. MCA, Inc., Hitchcock, and Stewart owned "Rear Window" along with the
renewal rights to the film. See id.
148. See id. at 212.
149. See id. at 213 (citing Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 494).
150. See id. The new release included public exhibition of the motion picture in theaters, on cable
television and videocassettes for sales and rental. The new media consisted of 35 and 16-millimeter
prints for theatrical exhibition in the U.S. as well as on videodiscs and videocassettes. See id.
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a sequel, interfered with his ability to make his own derivative work.'5' The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the assignee of a renewal term during the
first term "[like all purchasers of contingent interests, he takes subject to the
possibility that the contingency may not occur.152 The court reasoned that because
of the conflict that existed between the underlying and derivative copyrights, to rule
in favor of Petitioners would curtail the rights of the underlying copyright
proprietor.'53 The Court could find no support for this position in either the 1909
Act or 1976 Act.' 54 In fact, specifically looking at the legislative history of section
24 of the 1909 Act, the Court found that when "Congress altered the provision so
that the author could assign his contingent interest in the renewal term," that
assignment could not divest his statutory heirs of their rights to renew. "'
Turning next to the policy issues raised in the Rohauer decision, the Court
refrained from interpreting section 7 to create a new work that extinguishes any
infringement right the pre-existing work's proprietor may have held.15 6  In
balancing the equities, the Rohauer court made the pre-existing copyright irrelevant
by "shift[ing] the focus from the right to use the pre-existing work in a derivative
work to a right inhering in the created derivative work itself."'57 Because this
departure went against axiomatic principles of copyright--that an author owns
copyright only in that which owes its originality to him-it could not survive. 5 The
fact remains that so long as the underlying work remains out of the public domain,
it is protected no matter how intertwined with the subsequent work.'59
The final policy issue raised in the Abend decision addressed the concomitant
goal of the Copyright Act in ensuring that the public interest is protected by
151. See id. at 213-14. Abend claims that he was negotiating with HBO to create a play and a
television version of the story at the time of this re-release. See id.
152. See id. at 215.
153. Seeid. at216.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 217 (citing the Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. XV, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (superceded
by the Copyright Act of 1976), and the Copyright Act of February 3, 1831, ch. XVI, 4 Stat. 436
(superceded by the Copyright Act of 1976)).
156. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1990). 17 U.S.C. § 7 states in pertinent part:
"dramatizations ... of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the
copyright in such works.., shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions
of this title." 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1909) (current versions at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 303 (1976)).
157. See Abend, 495 U.S. at 222.
158. Seeid. at223.
159. See id. at 223-224 (citing Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976) ("It is irrelevant
whether the pre-existing work is inseparably intertwined with the derivative work"); Russell v. Price,
612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that infringement occurs when the derivative work no
longer has license as long as the underlying work remains protected); 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976)
("[C]opyright protection of a work extends to 'all matter therein in which copyright is already
subsisting, but without extending the duration or scope of such copyright"') (citation omitted)).
effective dissemination of creative works. " Amicus Columbia Pictures contended
that some owners would refuse to negotiate or would demand such an exorbitant
price that the derivative work would be retired from public use in contravention of
the public interest goal of the Copyright Act. 16 1 On this the Court deferred to
Congress. '62 Nonetheless, the Court commented that any exorbitant initial offer did
not preclude further negotiation.13 Moreover, despite the desire to strike a balance
between the artists' interest and the public's interest, the Copyright Act awards
artists a limited monopoly in their work, enabling them to obtain a fair price for the
fruit of their labors. " Consequently, if artists choose to withhold their work from
the public, that is their prerogative.
165
As a result of the harsh holding and potential severe ramifications in Stewart
v. Abend, studios negotiating assignments of copyright on works created between
1970 and 1978 take special precaution even to the point of avoiding purchasing the
work. 66  The "Abend Danger Zone," derived by subtracting twenty-eight years
from the present date and extending to January 1, 1978, targets works that were in
their first term on the effective date of the 1976 Act. 167 Although the Abend
decision attempted to protect authors, in actuality it has hurt authors. 168
I1. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
The Rohauer and Abend decisions reflect the need to revise the 1909
Copyright Act to accommodate the changing nature of derivative works. 69 In fact,
the Rohauer decision appeared to take into account the 1976 copyright revisions
160. See Abend, 495 U.S. at 228.
161. See id. (citing Brief of Amicus Curaiae Columbia Pictures Indus. at 21, Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207 (1990) (No. 88-2102)). This brief stated that in the instant action, respondent demanded 50%
of the movie's future gross proceeds "which are so exorbitant that a negotiated economic
accommodation will be impossible." See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 229.
165. See id. at 228-29.
166. See Professor Ronnie Mueller Copyright Class (October 30, 1998) (unpublished lecture notes,
Pepperdine University School of Law, on file with author). But see Saunders, supra note 2, at 180-81.
167. See Mueller, supra note 168.
168. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 633, quoting the response of motion picture representatives to the
1964 draft to the 1976 Copyright Act:
[iut has been and remains our position that any form of reversion whereby statutory
authorization is given to the author to terminate any transfer of the copyright or of any
exclusive right thereunder after a specified period of time, despite prior agreements to the
contrary, is wrong in philosophy, and would be harmful in result in this day and age. [ ]...
[W]e will continue to oppose any effort to impose a statutory restraint on the freedom of
persons to negotiate and contract with respect to rights in copyright properties....
Id.; see also Saunders, supra note 2, at 212 (noting that Abend stifled negotiations for works in their
first term of copyright under the 1909 Act due to economic barriers in producing a work because of the
difficulty in locating all potential heirs).
169. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 202-03.
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to the 1909 Act that had not yet come into effect. 7 While Rohauer attempted to
balance the equities, taking into account the extensive investment of the derivative
work proprietor, 7' Abend returned to a strict construction of the 1909 Act,
recognizing that the terms of the Act itself were ill-equipped to properly deal with
a derivative work that substantially contributed to the underlying work.17 2 When
derivative works consisted solely of making a play or musical from a novel, the
1909 Act solution adequately rewarded the parties for their contributions, either
underlying or derivative. Allowing two opportunities to negotiate the terms of
assignment to the author created the story line after a subsequent play incorporated
that story seemed fair. After all, the playwright merely visualized and publicized
the underlying work with minor changes. However, with the advent of motion
pictures the nature of derivative works forever changed and outgrow the 1909 Act
provisions.'73 The assignee of the underlying story then makes an independent
artistic effort as well as a substantial financial investment to develop the story into
a motion picture, hiring box office stars and director with pre and postproduction
expenses mounting into the tens of millions.' This independent effort should
receive protection but found none under the 1909 Act, or the subsequent law
interpreting it.'75
Even still, the supposed purpose of allowing the author's family to fully realize
the financial value of the underlying story at time of reversion often did not
materialize as demonstrated in the Rohauer case.'76 There, Mrs. Hull received
$21,000 for her initial assignment of the story.' However, the daughter's
subsequent re-assignment earned only $1250.' For this small sum, Rohauer, an
individual far removed from the author's family, prevented further exploitation of
the derivative work until such time as the court rendered its decision nearly six
170. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 620 (noting that the apparent exception Judge Friendly made to
§ 24 of the 1909 Act bears uncanny resemblance to the termination of transfer provision of the 1976
Copyright Act).
171. See Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493.
172. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 221-23 (1990).
173. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 631 (referring to Irvin Karp's comments during the hearings for
the 1976 Copyright Act where, speaking on behalf of authors, he noted motion pictures should be
exempt from reversion due to the great expense involved in creating something new).
174. See Josh Chetwynd, Lights, Camera, Money? Financiers play growing role in movie making,
USA TODAY, March 8, 1999, at B 1 (noting that according to the motion picture industry of America,
the average movie costs $53.4 million and those with big-name stars easily exceed $100 million not
including the additional $40 million marketing expense).
175. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 625.
176. See id.
177. See Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 486. It should be noted that the initial sum was intended to provide
compensation for both terms of copyright. See id.
178. See id.
years later.'79 Likewise, in Abend, the statutory heir's high demands placed the
underlying work in litigation for several years and eventually resulted in the
derivative work's retirement until expiration of the underlying work without a
second assignment.' 8 With the multiple re-assignments leading to copyright
disputes between parties unrelated to the author, the policy requirement to ensure
that the author or his family benefits from the assignment is often hollow.18" '
A. Congressional Hearings
Beginning in 1955, Congress investigated possible revisions to the 1909 Act
due to publishers' complaints of the over-paternalistic nature of the renewal
provision.182 In 1961 the Register of Copyright issued the Report of the Register
of Copyrights on the General Revision of the United States Copyright Law18 3 for
the purpose of crystallizing the core changes to later be incorporated into a bill.'8
Between 1961 to 1964 members of the copyright bar met with the Copyright Office
and other representatives of the interested parties to evaluate the proposals set forth
in the 1961 Report of the Register and draft a bill with alternative provisions.'
Once the initial bill appeared in 1964, it underwent revisions during 1965 based on
the voluminous comments received. 8 6 Extensive negotiations and compromises
ensued until the bill passed both Houses of Congress.'87 These negotiations stalled
for nearly ten years due to a conflict in Congress over the issue of community
antenna television. 188 But once that conflict was resolved in 1974, the legislative
activity recommenced and resulted in the passage of revision bill S.22 8 9 by both
Houses on September 30, 1976 and was signed into law by President Ford on
October 19, 1976.190
179. See id. at 486-87. The infringing action occurred on July 13, 1971. The Supreme Court denied
cert. on May 31, 1977. See id. at 484.
180. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). The 1982 complaint prevented the re-release of
the motion picture until after the Supreme Court rendered its 1990 decision. See id.; see also Rohauer,
551 F.2d at 486-87.
181. Killiam Shows, Inc. possessed the transferred rights in the initial term after the rights passed
through the hands of Moskowitz, Feature Productions, Inc., Artcinema Associates, Inc., and Gregstan
Enterprises. See id.
182. See Lohmann, supra note 1, at 901 n.36; see also Mimms, supra note 9, at 621.
183. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART I, REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm.
Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 REPORT OF THE REGISTER).
184. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 621.
185. See id. at 621-22.
186. See id. at 622.
187. See id. at 622.
188. See id.
189. See S. 22, 94th Cong., reported in 122 CONG. REc. 31988 (1976).
190. See id. The House and the Senate both made revisions to the bill. However, the Conference
Committee Report was adopted by both Houses. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976).
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B. The Freeze Period
While the congressional hearings pressed forward, Congress implemented a
"freeze" period between 1962 and 1977 to prevent subsisting copyrighted works
in their second term from falling into the public domain. 9 ' Because one of the
major revisions anticipated in the new copyright act included an extension of the
duration of copyright, Congress wanted to ensure that these works received the
benefit of that revision once the act became law. 192 Conversely, Congress did not
want any of these works to lose the benefit of the new revision due to the fact that
negotiations to enact the new legislation exceeded twenty years.' 93
IV. THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
The new act marked a significant departure from the prior philosophy of
copyright law "deal[ing] with problems undreamed of by the drafters of the 1909
Act."'' " Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright protection attached at the point
of creation of the work when an original work of authorship became fixed in
tangible form. 5 Consequently, the 1976 Act preempted common law copyright
protection entirely. 9 6 Although there were many changes incorporated in the 1976
Copyright Act, many of those changes are outside the scope of this article, which
will only address the major changes that affected duration and the use of derivative
works.' 97
A. Elimination of the Two Terms of Copyright
The fundamental difference between the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts was
the elimination of the two-term structure in exchange for a single term of life of the
author plus fifty years.'98 However, as of October 27, 1998, this term has been
191. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT § 5.01, at 336 (5th
ed. 1998).
192. See id.
193. See id. at 336-37.
194. See Mimms, supra note 3, at 622 (citing Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act
of 1976,22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 477,479 (1977)).
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
196. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
197. See Mimms, supra note 3, at 622-23.
198. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) see also Melville B. Nimmer, Termination of Transfers Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 947,952 (May 1977); Mimms, supra note 3, at 623.
extended to life of the author plus seventy years. 99 Subsisting statutory works in
their first term as of December 31, 1977, still must be renewed, but the renewal
term was extended by nineteen years for a total of forty-seven years for the second
term."°° Again, works in this category still under copyright on October 27, 1998,
received an additional twenty-year extension."0 ' Copyrighted works in their second
term as of December 31, 1977, received an initial nineteen-year extension and
202another twenty-year extension. Subsisting common law works also adopted the
single term provision of life of the author plus fifty years. 23 However, to prevent
works from being injected into the public domain immediately, they were
guaranteed protection until December 31, 2002 °.2' And, if the work was published
between' January 1, 1978, and December 31, 2002, it received protection at least
until December 31, 2027.205 Although the Sonny Bono Act did increase the single
term for these works by twenty years, it did not extend the minimum protection
dates.2"6
B. Termination of Transfers
Section 203 of the 1976 Act revived the concept of reversion by expressly
allowing the author or his statutory heirs to terminate the transfer after thirty-five
years from the date of the initial grant. 207 If the grant included the right of
publication, then termination could be affected thirty-five years from publication
or forty years from grant, whichever was earlier.20 8 Subsisting copyrighted works
as of December 31, 1977, also received a termination of transfer provision allowing
the author or his statutory heirs to reclaim the nineteen-year extension period.2 °9
The termination could be affected any time during a five year window
beginning from the thirty-fifth year of grant provided the author or his statutory
heirs gave statutory notice of termination as early as ten years, but no later than two
years prior to termination.2 1 1 The living author, or if deceased, his statutory heirs
199. See 17 U.S.C. § 302, amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (1998).
200. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
201. See 17 U.S.C. § 302, amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (1998).
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(b); 17 U.S.C. § 302, amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act (1998).
203. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a).
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See 17 U.S.C. § 302, amendedby Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (1998).
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 203. Section 203 states in pertinent part: "In the case of any work other than
a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any
right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is
subject to termination ......
208. See id.; see also Nimmer, supra note 200, at 975 (noting that the optional forty years was
included in consideration of publishing practices to contract for a work before it is even written).
209. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
210. See id. § 203(a)(4)(A).
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own the termination right. " ' The author's widow or widower owns the entire
termination interest unless there are surviving children or grandchildren of the
author.2"2 In that case, the widow owns a fifty percent interest and the children or
grandchildren split the remaining fifty percent interest equally.213
Like the reversion of the 1909 Act, the effect of the termination of transfers
provisions returns all of the rights subject to grant214 back to the author as of the
effective date of the termination.2 5 However, the termination provision expressly
does not apply to derivative works.2" 6 After years of stalemate between the authors
and derivative users, the termination of transfers provision represented a
compromise thus resolving their enduring tension.2"7 Or did it? The legislative
history of section 2032"' indicates that' reversion for the purpose of protecting
authors from unremunerative transfers was the most vehemently contested issue
during the revision hearings.21 9 Section 24 of the 1909 Act proved most problem-
atic due to the ambiguity created by enforcing contractual assignments of both
terms if the author survived while invalidating the contract when he did not.22
Some argued that enforcing the assignment into the second term defeated the
purpose of the reversion provision. It was argued that the assignee was left in a
dubious position unable to ascertain the statutory owner of the reversion until the
twenty-eighth year of the first term. 221 For these reasons, the renewal provision
was the most litigated section of the 1909 Act thereby warranting its removal from
211. See id. § 203(a)(1).
212. See id. § 203(a)(2).
213. See id.
214. Unlike the 1909 Act, the individual rights belonging to the copyrighted work may be assigned
jointly or separately. Consequently, the author may have only assigned the right to prepare a derivative
work while retaining the right to perform, display, reproduce or distribute the work. See NIMMER,
supra note 18, § 6.02 at 398-99.
215. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b).
216. See id. § 203(b)( 1) which states: "a derivative work, prepared under authority of the grant before
its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this
privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant."
217. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 625.
218. This article will summarize the key elements as to the termination of transfer provision and
derivative works exception thereto but does not purport to be a complete legislative history. For a
complete legislative history, see Mimms, supra note 9, at 626-34.
219. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 71 (Comm. Print 1965)
220. See 1961 REPORT OF THE REGISTER, supra note 115, at 53.
221. See id.; see also Mimms, supra note 9, at 626.
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the new act.222 The countervailing arguments of the Register of Copyright
nonetheless insisted on special protection for authors against unremunerative
transfers because of the unpredictability of the revenues generated by derivative
works and the inability of lump sum payments to adequately provide the author
with his fair share of the profits educed from his work.223 On the other hand,
derivative users and publishers refused to accept any provision other than one
providing complete assignment in exchange for a lump sum payment, arguing that
anything less would interfere with the parties right to contract freely and such
protection is no longer warranted given authors' strengthened bargaining position
modernly:224
We are not blind to the attractive force of the Register's proposals. There must
always be a certain glamour in the idea of riding forth, like a knight of old, to rescue
the maiden, authorship, from the dragon of unremunerative transfers. But the age
when a mean-spirited publisher would offer no more than 5 pounds to John Milton
for 'Paradise Lost' is as dead and gone as the age of chivalry. Today, the dragon is
a myth; the maiden, a muscular Brfinnehilde; and the gallant knight, we fear, more
nearly akin to Don Quixote than to St. George.225
Both the authors' groups and the motion picture industry representatives agreed
that any proposed termination of transfers provision should exempt motion pictures
and not all derivative works.226 Consequently, the end result met with disapproval
from both groups: authors' groups opposed the over-inclusiveness of all derivative
works in the exception; motion picture industry representatives objected to the
reversion concept entirely.227 Nonetheless, the parties compromised and accepted
the terms of section 203 as enacted.228
222. See 1961 REPORT OF THE REGISTER, supra note 115, at 53; see also Mimms, supra note 9, at
626; Mimms, supra note 3, at 626.
223. See 1961 REPORT OF THE REGISTER, supra note 185, at 53; see also Mimms, supra note 3, at
626.
224. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., I ST SESS., COPYRIGHT OF LAW REVISION,
PART 2, DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 230 (Comm. Print 1963) (comments of the Joint Copyright
Committee of American Book Publishers Council, Inc., and American Textbook Publishers Institute).
225. Mimms, supra note 3, at 628 (citing HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88th CONG., 1 st SESS.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 2, DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 362 (Comm. Print 1963)
[hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHTLAW REVISION, PART 2] (comments of the Copyright Committee of the
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.), & 104 (citing comments of Joseph Dubin).
226. See id. at 630-31 (citing COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 2, at 265 and HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 88th CONG., 2nd SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 3, PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 294 (Comm. Print
1964) [hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 3] (comments of Irwin Karp).
227. See id. at 633.
228. See id. at 634.
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1. The Derivative Works Exception
The derivative works exception to section 203 allows the existing derivative
work proprietor to continue exploiting that work after the underlying copyright
reverts but precludes any additional remake, sequels or other derivative works.229
An important limitation on the rights of a copyright owner under a terminated grant
is specified in section 203(b)(1). This clause provides that, notwithstanding a
termination, a derivative work prepared earlier may "continue to be utilized under
the conditions of the terminated grant; the clause adds, however, that this privilege
is not broad enough to permit the preparation of other derivative works. In other
words,-a film made from a play could continue to be licensed for performance after
the motion picture contract had been terminated, but any remake rights covered by
the contract would be cut off. 230
2. Who May Terminate a Transfer?
A "transfer" of copyright includes assignments as well as exclusive licenses
or conveyances of any of the exclusive copyright rights.231 The termination of
transfer provision does not apply to grants involving works for hire.232 Section 203
expressly precludes the author from divesting himself of the right to terminate the
copyright transfer by any agreement.2 3  Likewise, the termination provision bars
229. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1).
230. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. 551 F.2d 484,494 n. 11 (2nd Cir. 1977) (citing to S. Rep. No.
94-473 (1975) in enacting the 1976 Act).
231. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A 'transfer of copyright ownership' is an assignment, mortgage,
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not
including a nonexclusive license.").
232. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a); see also §§ 101 (defining works for hire), 201(b) (defining the
employer as the author of a work for hire).
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) & (2):
In the case of a grant executed by one author, termination of the grant may be effected by that
author or, if the author is dead, by the person or persons who, under clause (2) of this
subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total of more than one-half of that author's
termination interest. In the case of a grant executed by two or more authors of a joint work,
termination of the grant may be effected by a majority of the authors who executed it; if any
of such authors is dead, the termination interest of any such author may be exercised as a unit
by the person or persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to
exercise a total of more than one-half of that author's interest.
Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, and may be exercised, by
his widow or her widower and his or her children or grand-children ....
the author from bequeathing any grant by will.234 This exclusion operates to
prevent an author from disinheriting any of his statutory heirs. Intestacy may by
operation of law transfer a work but this is not considered a "grant." '235 When the
author dies, his statutory heirs identified in section 203 inherit the inalienability of
the termination rights but not before then. 236 Notably, if the author survives and
serves notice of termination but then dies prior to the effective date of the
termination, his estate and not his statutory heirs will receive the reversion.237 On
the other hand, if the author survives until the time in which he may serve notice
but does not in fact serve notice, then his statutory heirs take the reversion.2 38 The
class of recipients of the rights terminated is determined on the date notice of
termination was served rather than the effective date of termination.239 Hence, if
a surviving spouse of the author dies after already serving notice of termination, the
spouse's estate receives the spouse's interest in the terminated rights. 24° Con-
versely, if the spouse dies prior to serving notice, then the author's children own
the termination interest equally.
24 1
For works of joint authorship under a previously executed grant, the date of
execution of the grant becomes crucial.242 For grants executed after January 1,
1978, termination requires a majority of the joint authors who executed the grant
to be effected. 243 A "majority" is defined as the number of joint authors rather than
a majority ownership in the work.24 However, a single joint author may transfer
only as much interest in the work has he himself holds.245 When the other joint
authors appoint a smaller group of the joint authors to negotiate for all of the joint
authors, a grant executed by this small group will be considered the grant of all
when determining termination rights. 246
So, the majority joint-author rule allows a majority of the joint authors who
signed the original grant to terminate that grant at the proper time.247 If there were
five joint authors and three signed the grant, two of the three signatories may serve
notice to terminate. 248 But, one of the signatories could not join with two of the
non-signatories to affect termination.249
234. See Nimmer, supra note 200, at 955.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 957.
237. See id. at 963.
238. See id. at 963-64.
239. See id. at 971.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 964.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
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Grants of joint authorship works executed prior to January 1, 1978 do not
require a majority of joint authors to effect termination.25° However, the
termination pertains to the terminating author's interest only.251 Consequently, if
the other authors refuse to terminate, the grantee holds the grant as a tenant in
common with the terminating author.252
The difference between joint authorship grants before and after the effective
date of the 1976 Act is a function of the prior vesting issue where the second term
did not vest until renewal in the twenty-eighth year of the first term.253 Conse-
quently, the author had to survive until that period to effectuate renewal.2M If the
author did not survive, then by operation of law the grant terminated. 255 For this
reason, Congress thought it inappropriate to require more than individual
termination through the provisions of section 304.256 Whereas, grants executed
after the effective date of the 1976 Act are subject to section 203 in which the
rights have already vested.257 The distinction, therefore, should really be made
between contingent and vested rights rather than before or after the effective date
of the Act.25
When the statutory heirs hold the reversion, only a majority of them may affect
termination. 2 9 Because a widow/widower holds a fifty percent interest, no
termination may be affected without her consent." ° However, if there is no
surviving spouse, then a "per stirpes majority" of the statutory heirs may terminate
the grant executed either before or after the 1976 Act's effective date. 26' The
author's children share equally in the interest, but grandchildren of any deceased
child of the author share equally in that child's interest only.262 Consequently, the
author's grandchildren on their own do not create a majority where there are other
surviving children.263
For grants executed by renewal beneficiaries, the new (1976) Act requires a
unanimous decision of those renewal beneficiaries who joined in the grant to
250. See id. at 965.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 966.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 966-67.
257. See id. at 967.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 969.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(2)(B) and (C) (West 1999).
263. See Nimmer, supra note 200, at 969.
terminate that grant.2" This was made because of the confusion under the prior
1909 Act concerning the surviving spouse's ownership interest in the renewal.265
The court never resolved whether a surviving spouse owns a 50% interest in
renewal or just an equal interest along with the surviving children.266 In order to
avoid the issue altogether, Congress implemented a unanimous approval
requirement for grants made by renewal beneficiaries.267 Moreover, because the
right of termination is contingent upon the survival of the grantors at the time the
termination vests, the consenting renewal beneficiaries must survive until the
effective date of termination and not just to the date of the renewal vesting.26 In
other words, if all of the renewal beneficiaries who executed the original grant
survive through the notice of termination date, the grant cannot be terminated.269
Once termination is effected, the terminated rights belong to all of the statutory
heirs possessing a right to terminate instead of those who actually requested
termination.27° Ownership is proportionate to the heir's status, either as surviving
spouse, child or author's grandchild for any deceased child.27' As to grants by joint
authors, if the grant occurred on or after January 1, 1978, the rights revert to all
joint authors and not just those that terminated the transfer.72 However, for grants
prior to January 1, 1978, the termination is to the individual author requesting
termination only.273
3. The Inalienability of the Termination Right
As a result of the Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons decision, which
virtually undermined the purpose of the 1909 Act's renewal provision,2 74 the 1976
264. See id. at 972.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 972-73; see also Lohmann, supra note 1, at 910 (noting that the main difference
between 17 U.S.C. sections 203 and 304 is the person in whom the right to terminate vests. In 17
U.S.C. section 203 the right belongs solely to the author, while under 17 U.S.C. section 304 the authors
beneficiaries of the 1909 Act possess the right. "There is good reason for this difference. Under section
203, an author's widow or widower and children are given rights of termination if the author is dead,
but these rights apply only to grants by the author, and any effort by a widow, widower, or child to
transfer contingent future interests under a termination would be ineffective. In contrast, under the
present [1909] renewal provisions, any statutory beneficiary of the author can make a valid transfer or
license of future renewal rights, which is completely binding if the author is dead and the person who
executed the grant turns out to be the proper renewal claimant." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, at
140-41 (1976)).
269. See Nimmer, supra note 200, at 973; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(6)(B) (West 1999) ("The
future rights that will revert upon termination of the grant become vested on the date the notice of
termination has been served as provided by clause (4) of this subsection."). See id.
270. See Nimmer, supra note 200, at 973-74.
271. See id. at 974.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
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Act sought to circumvent any similar effect on the termination of transfers
provision by making the provision inalienable.275 Specifically, 17 U.S.C §
304(c)(5) states that the "[tiermination of the grant may be effected notwithstand-
ing any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to
make any future. grant, ' and any further grant of a terminated right may only be
made after the effective date of termination.277 Again, the purpose of these
provisions is to preclude any purchaser from exercising greater bargaining power
over the author by conditioning any sale on the author's agreement to surrender the
author's termination rights.278
V. CAN THIS TERMINATION PROVISION BE ALIENATED?
Because the termination provision has yet to be challenged in court due to the
fact that no grants executed on or after January 1, 1978 will be subject to
termination until 2013,279 representatives of the motion picture industry are trying
to anticipate various means to evade these provisions. °
A. Express Agreement Not to Regrant Terminated Rights
Melville B. Nimmer suggested a possible solution by having the grantor
terminate and reinstate the transfer contract so as to restart the thirty-five year
period.28 ' However, for two reasons, he defeated this argument. First, the later in
the contract period when the contract is rescinded, the more the author will demand
in remuneration, thereby defeating the purpose of canceling the contract in the first
place.2 2 Second, applying the contract principle of pre-existing duty, the new
contract would be void because it does not provide any further consideration for
the new promise extending the contract period." 3 Following Nimmer's example,
if A agrees to pay B $5,000 in exchange for the exclusive rights to use B's work
for six months, the initial contract is formed."s When A then convinces B to
rescind the initial contract so that B's duty may be changed to allow A to use B's
275. See Nimmer, supra note 200, at 982; see also Lohmann, supra note 1, at 907.
276. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(5) (West 1999).
277. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(4), 304(c)(6)(D); see also Lohmann, supra note 1, at 909.
278. See Nimmer, supra note 200, at 982-83; see also Lohmann, supra note 1, at 909.
279. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(3) (West 1999) (allowing thirty-five years from the earliest possible
grant under the 1976 Act).
280. See Nimmer, supra note 200, at 983.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id at 983-84.
284. See id.
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work for one year, the pre-existing duty rule nullifies the second agreement because
no new consideration has been provided by A for the extended contract period.285
Furthermore, drawing from Corbin,
upholding the second agreement would be "arguing in a circle, making the validity
of the new agreement depend upon the rescission while the validity of the rescission
depended upon the new agreement." Therefore, B is not bound, and under the rule
of mutuality, neither is A. Circularity is avoided only if there is a moment when A
is bound under neither the old nor the new agreement." 6
Another possibility exists in the terms of initial grant. If the grantor agrees in
the initial grant not to regrant the terminated rights should termination be effected,
such an agreement would not violate 17 U.S.C. section 203.287 17 U.S.C. sections
203 and 304 specifically prohibit any agreement that would eliminate or infringe
on the right to terminate, but they do not bar any agreement not to make additional
grants. 8 The benefit of this type of agreement is that it would dissuade the grantor
from terminating the rights in the first place.289 Also, because it precludes the
grantor from seeking out other buyers, the agreement could ensure that the original
purchaser could renegotiate an additional grant at a lower cost.2 ° However, this
solution may not overcome an argument asserting that the termination of provisions
of the 1976 Act indirectly preclude agreements of this nature. 291 Nimmer contends
that this type of agreement may be analogous to an "output" contract whereby "a
single customer agrees to purchase the entire output of a seller. '292 Although
output contracts are valid, in this instance the agreement may be held invalid on the
grounds that the agreement constitutes a "grant of exclusive rights to the original
grantee subject to the condition precedent that the copyright owner thereafter elects
to exploit the work. This conditional agreement to grant exclusive rights would be
purportedly nonterminable and, to that extent, void. '293 Moreover, agreements
constricting the grantor's right to grant terminated rights without imposing a
reasonable time limit may be invalid as a restraint on trade, alienation, or
competition.294
285. See id.
286. Id. (citing 1A ARTHUR LINTON. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 186 (1963)).
287. See id. at 985.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 985 n.206.
293. See id. at 985.
294. See id. at 985-86 & n.208.
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B. Assignment Agreements with Potential Beneficiaries
As to works created under the 1909 Act in their first term, the practice has
been to obtain assignment agreements from the statutory heirs in anticipation of the
death of the author prior to renewal.295 Where the renewal claimants are properly
identified, these agreements will be binding."' However, the difficulty arises in
identifying the renewal beneficiaries in the first place. Divorce, death of the spouse
or child, remarriage, or the birth of a new child after the initial grant and before the
renewal term, all effect who the statutory beneficiaries will be when the renewal
term vests. Still, even if there was a valid binding agreement as to the identified
renewal recipients, under 17 U.S.C. section 304, these recipients have been given
the opportunity to reclaim the extended term."'
C. Life Insurance Policy
Taking out a life insurance policy on the author provides another solution
applicable only to 1909 Act works. Under the 1909 Act, the death of the author
prior to renewal places the entire risk on the assignee. 98 The author, in naming the
assignee.as his beneficiary in a specific policy, allows the assignee to negotiate
with the author for an assignment of the renewal term. Because the assignee stands
to regain the value of consideration offered for the renewal term from the life
insurance policy in the event that the author fails to survive at the time of renewal,
the assignee is more willing to undertake such an agreement. This solution only
applies to the 1909 Act and not the 1976 Act. Because the 1976 Act removed the
renewal term replacing it with the termination of transfers provisions, a life
insurance policy would be fruitless in circumventing the termination of transfer
right which the author retains in life and death.
295. See Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484,493 (2nd Cir. 1977) (discussing the practice
of some holders of derivative copyrights to obtain consents from identifiable statutory successors in
order to protect their present interest in the derivative work). This practice has not been settled by law.
The court stated that there is little force in this practice because of the difficulty in identifying the
statutory successors. See id.
296. See Lohmann, supra note 1, at 910 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th CONG. 2d SESS. 47,140-
41(1976)).
297. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West 1999) (extending the second Court term by nineteen years. The
second term was then extended again under the Sonny Bono Act by an additional twenty years. See
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 11 Stat. 2827, 2827-
28.
298. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 219 (1990) (holding that the assignment of the renewal
term is an expectancy only).
D. Abandonment of Copyright
Intentional abandonment of copyright may occur in several scenarios: (1)
where an original computer programmer who created a now obsolete program,
which, during the transfer period, has been redeveloped in new code in the 13th
version of the program; (2) news broadcast videotapes which are destroyed one
week subsequent to airing; (3) a building owner who hires a painter to create a
mural requests an abandonment so that the mural may be destroyed; (4) a joint
author spitefully abandons copyright in a joint work over a dispute with a co-
author.299
Abandonment requires an overt action on the part of the copyright proprietor.
Judge Learned Hand set forth the abandonment test forty years ago in stating:
we do not doubt that the "author or proprietor of any work made the subject of
copyright" by the Copyright Law may "abandon" his literary property in the "work"
before he has published it, or his copyright in it after he has done so; but he must
"abandon" it by some overt act which manifests his purpose to surrender his rights
in the "work," and to allow the public to copy it. 300
Any owner of an individual copyright, including those obtained by assign, may
abandon the rights to copyright.3 0 ' Because a copyright contains a bundle of rights
that can be individually or jointly assigned or transferred, the current holder of the
right can likewise abandon them individually or jointly.3 2 The effect of abandon-
ment is the loss of right to sue for copyright infringement as evidenced by the
current use of abandonment as a valid defense in infringement actions. 3 When a
copyright has been abandoned, the original copyright owner no longer has standing
to sue because he has forfeited his ownership interest. ° 4
1. Rationale of Abandonment
There are numerous reasons to support the rationale of abandonment. First,
the 1976 Act is silent on the issue of abandonment, which is a judicially created
doctrine.30 5 Congress' silence should not be construed as an elimination of the
299. See Robert A. Kreiss, Abandoning Copyrights to Try to Cut Off Termination Rights, 58 Mo.
L. REV. 85, 94-95 (1993) (discussing the possibilities of intentionally abandoning copyright in order
to circumvent the inalienability of the reversion right in copyright).
300. Id. at 92-93 (citing National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594,
598 (2d Cir. 1951), modified, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952)).
301. See id. at 96.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 92.
304. See id.
305. See id. at 97.
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doctrine as it pertains to copyright."3 Instead, without an express exclusion in the
congressional record, this silence could arguably be construed as implied consent
to applying this doctrine." 7 Second, because abandonment is an equitable doctrine
akin to estoppel or laches, the court should apply it when the copyright owner
desires to relinquish copyright.3"8 Third, as a matter of public policy, abandonment
furthers the intent of the Copyright Act because it allows the author to place his
work into the public domain thereby increasing access to the public of the work.3 9
Because abandonment places works in the public domain earlier than otherwise
under copyright law, the public benefits." ° Moreover, it removes any uncertainty
the public may have as to permissibility of copying a given work."' Furthermore,
abandonment upholds the incentive purpose behind the copyright law.312 Kreiss
rightly points out that the framers of the U.S. Constitution intended copyright
protection as an incentive to "promote the Progress of Science" by allowing the
author of the work to obtain remuneration from the exploitation of his work.3"3
Conversely, this does not mean that the author must exploit his work-"the
copyright system is an incentive system, not a coercive one."3 4
Finally, abandonment honors personal freedom and autonomy.1 5 Kreiss ties
the notion of abandonment of copyright property with the traditional view towards
property that an owner can do what he wishes with his property as a freedom
reserved in the U.S. Constitution." 6
2. Balancing Abandonment Doctrine with purpose of termination of
transfers fails to yield desired result
Despite all of the reasons to support abandonment, abandonment still defies
the statute regarding termination of transfers, which prohibits "any agreement to
the contrary." 317 Agreeing to abandon a copyright right constitutes an agreement
to the contrary because the effect of such agreement would "nullify the termination
306. See id. at 98.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 99.
310. See id.
311. Seeid.
312. See id.
313. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
314. See id.
315. See id. at 100.
316. See id.
317. See id. at 114 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5).
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rights."3"' Under the "Semi-Literalist Position" an author can abandon his copyright
right because abandonment is neither a waiver nor new grant.319 Kreiss both
creates and destroys the "Semi-Literalist Position." Although the statute literally
does not forbid abandonment, abandonment stands diametrically opposed to the
purpose of termination of transfers and therefore should be rejected.320 Kreiss is
concerned with authors who would be forced to abandon reversionary rights
leading to the same result as a waiver of the termination rights-what Congress
explicitly prohibits.321
A "Minimalist Balancing Position" invalidates abandonment of reversionary
rights yet allows abandonment of other copyright rights.322 This theory strikes the
proper balance between abandonment and termination of transfers by allowing the
author whom truly seeks to renounce remuneration to do so while protecting the
widow/child of the author.323 However, abandonment of copyright from the
derivative works creator's perspective, i.e., the motion picture studios, is counter-
productive because it exposes the studio to competition for sequels and other
derivative works from the public at large, rather than the narrow class of copyright
holders holding the reversionary interest.
E. Works Made for Hire
17 U.S.C. sections 203 and 304 expressly do not include works for hire. A
work made for hire, as defined by section 101, is either a work prepared by an
employee acting within the scope of his employment, or a specially ordered or
commissioned work.324 If the work is a specially ordered or commissioned work,
however, it must first belong to one of the following categories before it will be
considered a work made for hire: collective work, motion picture or audiovisual
work, supplementary work, a translation, compilation, instructional text, a test,
answer material for a test or an atlas.325 Ownership of a work made for hire,
including all copyright rights, belongs to the employer, unless there is a signed
written agreement expressly stating otherwise.326
The present imbalance in bargaining power could lead to a change in the
course of business among the studios:
the company can avoid the consequences of termination by insisting that the work
be a work made for hire. This could be accomplished either by requiring the
318. See id. at 114-15.
319. See id. at 116.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 116-17.
322. See id. at 120-21.
323. See id.
324. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1)-(2) (1994).
325. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2).
326. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
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outsider to be or become an employee of some company and do the work within the
scope of his or her employment, or by assuring that the work satisfy the conditions
for being a "specially ordered or commissioned" work.32
As with the Abend problem where studios intentionally choose not to use
works within the Abend danger zone in order to avoid the problem, studios may
choose to boycott any work that is not a work made for hire.32 This option would
totally eliminate an author's bargaining power-undermining the purpose of the
Copyright Act. Still, it is a viable option. With the number of screenwriters
available today vying for an opportunity to have their work produced, the studios
are not at a loss for material.329 Moreover, screenwriters, faced with no other option
in getting their work produced, would likely agree to become employees of the
studio.
F. Amendment
Given the rapid expansion of the motion picture entertainment industry in the
last decade, the stakes in creating a motion picture have risen drastically. 3 ° It is not
all that uncommon for a film to cost a studio $100 million to produce with
absolutely no guarantee that the film will be a box office success.33' The studio
327. See Kreiss, supra note 301, at 89 n.8 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101) (1999)).
328. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 211 (noting the economic non-viability of purchasing a work
during the first term of copyright). Saunders states, "[f]ar from giving authors the second bite at the
apple that the Supreme Court found so important, Stewart might deprive authors of a first chance to
profit from the sale of derivative rights to their works." Id. Under the protection of anonymity, a few
major studio lawyers and entertainment lawyers have indicated that this has in fact been the practice
since the Abend decision. If a screenplay is purchased, it is always rewritten by the studio writers so
that it becomes a work for hire.
329. See JAYS. KENOFF& RICHARD K. ROSENBERG, ENTERTAINMENTINDUSTRY CONTRACrs 2.02
(Donald G. Farber ed., Apr. 1999).
330. See Richard Natale, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, at G1 (discussing the competition between
studios for audience during the fall). Citing a senior studio executive who indicated that of the 60 films
due for release between Labor Day and November 11 th, the cut-off before the Christmas holiday
releases, only 5 will make money, 15 to 20 will break even and 30 will flop. See id.
331. See Claudia Eller, Despite Woes of "Waterworld," Big Movies Won't Dry Up, L.A. TIMES,
July 25, 1995, at Dl (noting the disastrous $175 million budget for Waterworld). With stars
demanding between $15 million and $20 million per picture, big event movies cost between $70 million
and $100 million to make. See id.; see also John Lippman and James Bates, Dolgen Considered Sharp
in More Ways Than One, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at D1 (explaining the constant debt pressure on
heads of studios, the article notes that Addams Family Values, despite being a box office hit sequel,
significantly contributed to the studio's $36.6 million quarterly loss); Josh Chetwynd, Lights, Camera,
Money? Financiers Play Growing Role in Movie Making, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 1999, at B 1 (noting
the average cost of a movie at $53.4 million while a movie with big-name stars averages $100 million,
not including $40 million in marketing costs).
alone bears this risk.332 The motion picture industry has vehemently opposed any
termination of transfer provision for this reason.333 Once again, the nature of the
industry has outgrown the effectiveness of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Although the intended purpose of the two-term structure of the 1909 Act and
the termination of transfers provision of the 1976 Act was to protect authors from
unremunerative grants, no similar protection is provided to the motion picture
studio when the film flops."' The Constitution set forth an intention to promote
the sciences and useful arts by allowing authors and inventors a limited monopoly
in their work so that they may enjoy the fruit of their labor.33 Now, however, the
producer and studio who together create a motion picture, stand in the shoes of the
constitutional author.3 6
Despite its intention to balance the bargaining powers, the present statute
creates its own imbalance by assuming that all authors have no bargaining power.
This is simply not the case. Any author that has already had a marginal success,
now has a literary agent and attorneys negotiating contracts on his behalf for any
future works the author may write. 3 7 Additionally, the Writers Guild ensures that
all writers, whether members of the Guild or not, receive a minimum $60,000 per
script. 338 The statute as written, therefore, improperly equates authors with no
332. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 216-17. "[T]here is a fundamental inequity in granting the
underlying-work author the right to profit from a film's commercial success when that author bears
none of the risk of commercial failure. Every purchaser of motion picture rights embarks on a
speculative venture: the film might be a box office flop or might not be produced at all." Id. at n.216;
see also Claudia Eller, Disney is Counting on Major Disaster, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1998, at Dl
(commenting on the $200 million budget of Armageddon, Eller notes that the studio bears the entire
risk of recouping its investment). Eller also noted that because of the competition with Deep Impact,
a similarly themed motion picture released prior to Armageddon, the studio had to invest significantly
more into the film by way of special effects in order to regain the audience siphoned off by Deep
Impact. See id.
333. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 633 (citing the comments of the motion picture representatives
during the congressional hearings on the 1976 Copyright Act).
334. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 216.
335. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8 (promoting the progress of science and the "useful Arts," by
securing for limited times to authors and investors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries).
336. See id. The motion picture industry should be considered a useful art modernly.
337. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 216-17 (noting it is less of a gamble where the endeavor is based
on a best-selling novel or involves a major star or director but, in those instances, the negotiating price
for the rights will be higher).
338. See Interview with William Henslee, Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law,
Malibu, Cal. (Jan. 22, 1999).
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bargaining power with those that do.33 9
To rebalance the scales and properly consider the risk that the studio takes by
investing upwards of $100 million dollars to produce a derivative motion picture
from an already successful novel, an amendment to the Copyright Act redefining
"author" is necessary. Congress noted while enacting the present Copyright Act
that the relationship between author and publisher had changed. Prior to the
enactment of the Copyright Act, agencies published authors' work with little or no
alterations. Yet, publishers were entitled to some remuneration when they
published and circulated the work. The author in this situation provided all of the
creativity that the Constitution sought to promote. Because the value of the work
was not known prior to any circulation of the work, the 1909 Act's reversion
system properly allowed the author to renegotiate with the publisher once the
success of the novel was known."4 Recognizing a shift in the investment and
creative contribution of derivative works with the advent of the motion picture
industry, Congress sought to rebalance the equities by providing a derivative works
exception to the termination of transfers provision of the 1976 Act."' However,
Congress failed to consider that motion picture negotiations are based on the
established value of the novel. Simply put, if the novel were not already a popular
story, there would be no interest in a motion picture. If the novel is one that has
long been forgotten, however, a successful motion picture based on it has the
potential to revive book sales thereby benefitting the holder of the publishing
rights. Without the movie, the novel would have remained forgotten.
For all of the above reasons, an amendment should give proper consideration
to the actual bargaining power of the given author. Protection should be limited
to authors of truly unequal bargaining power, i.e., first time authors of novels or
screenplays unpublished or unproduced. Once an author is published for the first
time, the success of his work and his potential for future success in additional
works becomes apparent through sales of the work.342 Alternatively, screenwriters
receiving $750,000 or less for a script would provide an easily distinguishable
339. See Kreiss, supra note 301, at 110 (stating that to prevent publishers from taking advantage of
authors Congress made the termination rights non-waivable and non-transferable).
Had Congress not done this, then the authors needing the greatest protection-those with an
"unequal bargaining position"-would have ended up no better off .... Authors who have a
strong enough bargaining position so that they could retain the termination rights would
presumably be able to enter into transfers that provide adequate remuneration in the first place.
Id.
340. See 17 U.S.C. § 42, superceededby 17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1999).
341. See Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 494 (2nd Cir. 1977).
342. An author's status may also be measured by screen credit since the regulations for screen credits
are strictly monitored. Those authors entitled to sole created-by status would not need protection but
authors sharing credit lines may.
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dividing line between writers needing protection and those that do not. In either
scenario, the bargaining field has been leveled at this stage. Consequently, the
need for such paternalistic means for all authors as depicted in the 1976 Copyright
Act significantly diminishes. The 1909 Act's congressional hearings drew from
the experience of Samuel Clemens who sold Innocents Abroad for a small sum in
its initial term. 343 However, because he retained the renewal rights, he renegotiated
a lucrative second term." Furthermore, Samuel Clemens went on to become a
prolific writer under the pen name, Mark Twain. Undoubtedly, he was able to set
his price on subsequent publications. In the era of the "big deal," neither side lacks
representation. Screenwriter Shane Black sold his first screenplay for a record $1
million. Black's screenplay eventually became the motion picture "Lethal
Weapon." '345 In 1994 Shane Black's latest script again broke the monetary barrier
earning the writer $4 million for "The Long Kiss Goodnight." '346 In fact, this script
set off a bidding war amongst three major studios. 47 Black hardly lacked
bargaining power.34
An amendment should likewise exempt motion pictures from the termination
of transfers provision altogether. As a concession to the great risk the studio takes
in the investment of a derivative motion picture, the studio should be entitled to
create and control further derivative works long after the termination of transfers
provision expires. If the underlying work experiences success solely because the
derivative work made it popular, it does not seem logical to allow the underlying
author the ability to hold a derivative work hostage for further negotiations.
Usually, the derivative motion picture is successful because of the choices made
by the producer as to the director and talent involved. A prime example of this is
"Rear Window" which became a classic motion picture because of Alfred
Hitchcock's innovative camera angles and direction coupled with Jimmy Stewart's
character development. 49 These are the features that endeared that film in the
hearts of the public, not the underlying basic story line. Consequently, the "author"
of those features alone should be entitled to reap further benefit through the
remakes and sequels.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of any copyright law must keep in line with the directives of the
framers of the Constitution in seeking to promote the sciences and useful arts and
343. See Mimms, supra note 9, at 600.
344. See id.
345. See Claudia Eller, Entertainment Desk: Hollywood Habits, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1994, at Fl.
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See id. Black was represented by David Greenblatt at ICM throughout the negotiations. See
id.
349. Hitchcock's unique use of shadows and angles in the black and white medium to create tension
and suspense created an entire genre that is studied today in film schools.
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provide the public access to them. It is a balancing between the creator of the work
and the party delivering the work to the public. In the time of the first American
copyright act, that equation was simple. But, with the ever-expanding technology
and popularity of the motion picture industry, the equation has developed a
complexity on the level of quantum physics. A bright line rule in light of this
complexity does not serve any of the parties well. In fact, it could wind up hurting
authors if the studios are forced to take independent action by opting to use only
works made for hire. 5 ° If there is to be a bright line rule, then it must be narrowly
tailored to fit the interest it is designed to serve. In this instance, narrowing the
definition of author to only those authors who have yet to publish accomplishes the
purpose of protecting authors of unequal bargaining power while allowing those
with equal bargaining power to contract freely. Where the industry has changed
altogether, the law must be updated to accommodate it. Otherwise, the courts will
be forced to determine congressional intent over matters on which it has surely
never opined.
KATHLEEN M. BRAGG
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350. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. This practice is already well-established as the
means of doing business among studio executives; see also Brian Lowry, Networks Called for
Interference, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at F1 (noting the substantial interference network executives
inflict over a writer's vision arbitrarily rewriting scripts).

